One of the units reported directly into the flagship magazine division. The second unit reported to the centralized marketing division, which supported the other two publishing divisions. This duplication of effort stemmed from a situation many years earlier when the central analytic unit did a very poor job of supporting the flagship magazine. As a result, the flagship magazine division created its own unit. Since then the circumstances had changed. An executive who was considered an industry leader was running the central unit, and service levels had increased tremendously. Now both heads of their respective divisions agreed there should only be one group doing analytics, but each believed that his own unit could do the job better. The executive vice president (EVP) to whom both division heads reported did not want to address this issue for fear of demoralizing either team member, each of whom was a high performer. As a result, both analytic units were left untouched–and there was duplication.

Clearly it would have been far more efficient to have one unit performing the analytics function. But the two executives in charge of the units were fiercely protective of their own units. Neither believed that you could have one combined analytics center of excellence that reported to the other.

The EVP who oversaw the two divisions didn’t want to look like he was favoring one manager over the other. Each of them had a large degree of autonomy and responsibility, and it was important to him that each was in control of his own resources. He knew there should only be one unit, but he didn’t want to dictate the answer to them–he wanted them to figure it out for themselves. If he chose a winner, by default, there would be a loser. This was a zero-sum game, and the EVP didn’t want to demoralize either of his high-performing executives. And he had another concern. One of the potential losers was very close to the EVP’s boss, the CEO. If, as a result of his decision, the company lost an executive for whom it had high hopes, the EVP didn’t relish the thought of facing the CEO’s wrath.

Have there been times in your career when you went out of your way to avoid controversy? What was the result?

One national moving company was self-insured–that is, rather than buying an insurance policy to cover damages to customers’ furniture, it paid out itself for its own damages. The company’s claims department was trying to keep as low as possible what it paid out in damages. The head of claims pored over the claims and payout data, looking for some insight into how he could reduce claims, but the figures remained steady.

The company cut the data in many different ways to try to get a handle on the claims it was paying out. Was damage related to time of day (were the drivers tired), to geographic location (were some areas not as well managed), or to type of house (was the presence of stairs more likely to cause damage)? During their change project, the company decided to sort its damage data differently. Rather than continuing to look at the data in the traditional way, the company cut the data by the type of item that was being damaged. The results were revealing. More than 25 percent of damage claims–almost $700,000 a year–were for damage to dining room tables.

The results were as surprising as they were revealing. The company managed very successfully to transport glass, antique furniture, artwork, and sensitive electrical equipment such as computers. Why was it failing so badly with such a traditional, sturdy piece of furniture as a dining room table?

The mystery here resulted from the Organizational Silos barrier–knowledge and information do not flow freely across silos. The drivers knew exactly why dining room tables were being damaged in such great quantity. When the claims department asked them about the high rate of damage to dining room tables, the reason became clear. Typically drivers used the dining room table as a worktable to pack the rest of the home. As a result, it often became scratched or dented as items were dropped on it. And because the table was being used in the packing process, it was also one of the last items to be loaded onto the truck. If the table was not secured properly, it would be the first item to shift around and get damaged during transit. Or, worse still, if an item actually fell out of the truck when the door was opened, it was inevitably the dining room table.

When is the last time you really examined silos within your organization? What did you find?

Tom’s manager, Joe, had long been against the idea and had shot it down whenever Tom raised it. Joe said he was afraid that raising the price significantly would be seen as gouging the customer.

I later found out that Joe did not believe it was a bad idea. He had believed that his boss, the division manager, would be against it.

Joe’s boss had already been driving home how important customer service was and how much the business should value customers and their views. Customers with safety deposit boxes were usually very wealthy and, thus, were among the very best clients. While Joe didn’t know how his boss would feel, he also didn’t want to risk finding out. He didn’t want to risk raising an idea that had even the slightest chance of getting shot down.

It is human nature to try to think through what superiors might think about an idea. Joe thought the idea might reflect poorly on him, and he was afraid that his boss would believe he hadn’t been listening to the customer service message. The message Tom and his peers got was “don’t scare the customer.”

What are the most common management blockers that you observe in your career?